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1 Introduction
Stochastic versions of the overlapping generations model of Allais (1947) and Samuel-
son (1958) can be useful models for macroeconomic policy making, but not before the
theoretical and quantitative implications of indeterminacy are properly accounted for.
In deterministic versions of the model, indeterminacy may exist,1 but it has no effects
in the long run as all equilibria converge to one of the steady states.2 This paper consid-
ers stochastic versions of the model and decomposes indeterminacy into two types: one
characterized by the initial conditions and one characterized by incomplete financial
markets. We introduce a numerical algorithm to compute the entire set of competitive
equilibrium. We use simulations to approximate the volatility of consumption across
cohorts and the volatility of asset prices. Our findings show that indeterminacy has
long-run effects and is an order of magnitude more important than endowment shocks
in explaining long-run consumption and asset price volatility.
In deterministic overlapping generations (OLG) models, a sufficient condition for
a determinate equilibrium is the property of gross substitution in consumption.3 This
property is implausible given the empirical findings of Mankiw, Rotemberg and Sum-
mers (1985). In the same setting, Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford (1990) and Wang
(1993) have conjectured that even if the equilibrium set is indeterminate, all equilibria
in that set converge in the long run to one of the steady states. This conjecture has been
numerically verified for a handful of canonical economies in Kehoe and Levine (1990)
and Feng (2013), where the former log-linearized the equilibrium system of equations
and the latter numerically approximated the entire equilibrium set.4
In stochastic overlapping generations (SOLG) models, the properties of existence
and Pareto inefficiency of recursive equilibria have been analyzed in Citanna and Siconolfi
(2010) and Henriksen and Spear (2012), respectively.5 However, very little is known
about indeterminacy in SOLG models. Several papers have provided examples showing
the existence of a continuum of recursive (stationary Markov) equilibria (Farmer and
Woodford, 1997; Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford, 1990), but conditions for either the
existence or nonexistence of indeterminacy are unavailable. The present paper focuses
on the indeterminacy of competitive equilibria and studies its impact on the aggregate
1See Gale (1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1984), Kehoe and
Levine (1984), and Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell, and Woodford (1991).
2See Kehoe and Levine (1990), Spear, Srivastava, and Woodford (1990), Wang (1993), and Feng
(2013).
3See Gale (1973), Balasko and Shell (1980), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1984), Kehoe and
Levine (1984), and Kehoe, Levine, Mas-Colell, and Woodford (1991).
4Gomis-Porqueras and Haro (2003, 2007) introduced techniques to characterize all equilibrium
manifolds, but their method cannot extend to the stochastic models considered in the present paper.
5Citanna and Siconolfi (2010) proves generic existence of recursive equilibria, a complement to the
non-existence examples provided in Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004). Henriksen and Spear (2012)
proves that even with sequentially complete markets (number of assets equals number of states), the
recursive equilibrium allocation is not (interim) Pareto efficient. This complements Demange (2002),
which shows that the recursive equilibrium allocations are Pareto efficient if markets are sequentially
complete and a long-lived real asset in positive net supply (land) is traded.
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economy, specifically on the consumption and asset price volatility.
In deterministic OLG models, equilibrium indeterminacy arises whenever a con-
tinuum of endogenous initial period variables are consistent with equilibrium. Each
equilibrium is indexed by the vector of initial period variables which are typically asset
prices or portfolio choices, though this paper looks at shadow prices of investment. Feng
(2013) characterizes the entire set of initial period variables consistent with equilibrium
and demonstrates that each numerically approximated equilibrium converges to one of
the steady states. Although the equilibrium set is indeterminate, there are no effects
in the long run.
This paper considers a SOLG model and characterizes two types of indeterminacy:
initial condition indeterminacy and incomplete markets indeterminacy. Initial condi-
tion indeterminacy is identical to the indeterminacy described in deterministic settings
and is indexed by the endogenous variables in the initial period. Incomplete markets
indeterminacy is a new type of indeterminacy that arises in stochastic settings. As
the name suggests, incomplete markets is a necessary condition for incomplete mar-
kets indeterminacy. Long-run effects only occur in the presence of incomplete markets
indeterminacy.
Consider a simple incomplete markets setting with a 3-period lived representative
consumer born every period, a risk-free bond (1 asset), and 2 states of uncertainty each
period. The 3 periods of a consumer's life are denoted young, middle-aged, and old. The
equilibrium variables consist of the vector of asset prices and portfolio choices. In any
node, only two consumers participate in the bond market: the young and the middle-
aged. By market clearing, we only consider the portfolio choice of the middle-aged. An
equilibrium is characterized by Euler equations for the young and middle-aged (recall
we already internalized the market clearing condition). We use the Euler equations
for the middle-aged to determine the portfolio choice for the middle-aged, reducing the
system to only Euler equations for the young and the asset prices.
In the initial period t = 0, the initial middle-aged and the initial old are endowed
with a wealth vector. If we fix these parameters and the initial period shock, the young
agents affected by the initial conditions are only those born in periods t = 0 and t = 1.
There exists one equilibrium equation for the young born in period t = 0 and two for the
young born in period t = 1 (1 for each node in period t = 1). Denoting q (s0, ..., st) as the
asset price in period t for the history of shocks (s0, ..., st) , the equilibrium equations are
written in the form (where the subscript y denotes the Euler equation for the young):
eey
(
q (s0) , (q (s0, s1))s1∈{1,2}
)
= 0.
eey
(
q (s0, s1) , (q (s0, s1, s2))s2∈{1,2}
)
= 0 for s1 ∈ {1, 2} .
These equations are in terms of 7 asset price variables, 1 for each node in periods t = 0
through t = 2.
As we can see, the number of variables exceeds the number of equations. This
captures the dimension of the initial condition indeterminacy. If we denote S as the
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number of states of uncertainty each period and J as the number of assets, there are
J(1 + S) equations and J(1 + S + S2) asset price variables, implying JS2 degrees of
freedom. In the deterministic case, S = J = 1, there exists 1 degrees of freedom, which
is consistent with what Kehoe and Levine (1990) would find for a real asset economy.6
As stressed above, the presence of this form of indeterminacy in a stochastic setting is
not novel, but merely an extension of the indeterminacy analyzed by Kehoe and Levine
(1990) for the case of real assets. Magill and Quinzii (2003) analyze indeterminacy
in stochastic OLG models with 2-period lived representative consumers. In such a
model, one needs to introduce an infinitely-lived asset that pays no dividends (usually
called fiat money) to facilitate inter-generational trade. Hence this model only captures
nominal indeterminacy. Kehoe and Levine (1990) consider a deterministic setting with
3-period lived consumers. They show that indeterminacy can still exist without fiat
money. We restrict ourselves to an analysis of real indeterminacy by only including real
assets in a stochastic OLG model with 3-period lived consumers.7 Including nominal
assets in a stochastic setting with 3-period lived consumers would lead to even greater
indeterminacy than what we find in the present paper.
Continuing with our example, the progression to a new node in period t ≥ 2 in-
troduces 3 Euler equations for the newborn young, but 2 of these are period t + 1
middle-aged Euler equations, which are used to determine the 2 middle-aged bond
choices in period t+ 1. There is then just 1 new equation, the Euler equation in period
t for the newborn young, together with 2 new asset price variables, 1 for each of the 2
nodes that can arise in period t+ 1 :
eey
(
q (s0, ..., st) , (q (s0, ..., st, st+1))st+1∈{1,2}
)
= 0.
With 2 new variables and only 1 new equation, there exists 1 degree of freedom. Using
the previous notation, each new node introduces J new Euler equations and SJ new
asset price variables, implying J(S − 1) degrees of freedom. In the deterministic case,
S = J = 1, there are 0 degrees of freedom, consisting with the findings in Kehoe and
Levine (1990) and Feng (2013). Under sequentially complete markets (S = J), there
exist S (S − 1) degrees of freedom, which is consistent with the findings from Henriksen
and Spear (2012) for the S = J = 2 case.8
6The comparable economy considered in Kehoe and Levine (1990) is one in which the initial
endowment of the nominal asset (money) is fixed. For these economies, the authors find 1 degree of
freedom.
7Our asset structure is most similar to the asset structures in Citanna and Siconolfi (2010) and
Henriksen and Spear (2012), who analyze the properties of existence (of recursive equilibrium) and
Pareto efficiency, respectively.
8In stochastic OLG settings with consumers living for at least 3 periods, the concept of complete
and incomplete markets is more complicated than simply comparing the number of assets to the
number of possible states of uncertainty in the subsequent period. Even with sequentially complete
markets (J = S), the asset structure is not complete in the sense that it is unable to support an interim
Pareto efficient allocation in equilibrium (see Henriksen and Spear, 2012). There are several ways to
modify the asset structure in order to complete the markets. Demange (2002) and Henrisken and
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Our decomposition of indeterminacy into two types is stark as the indeterminacy
that we refer to as incomplete markets indeterminacy can only arise in economies with
uncertainty. In that sense, it is quite different than initial condition indeterminacy,
which captures the entirety of the indeterminacy that is found in deterministic models.
Furthermore, only the former can lead to long run effects. Our objective in this paper is
not only to characterize the conditions under which incomplete markets indeterminacy
arises, but also to estimate the effects of such indeterminacy on simulated time paths
of equilibrium variables.
Formally, incomplete markets indeterminacy is present when the dimension of the
image of the equilibrium transition correspondence is strictly positive. With such an
equilibrium correspondence, there exists a continuum of next-period endogenous state
variables that are consistent with equilibrium. This form of indeterminacy is closely
related to the concept of initial condition indeterminacy that occurs in the deterministic
setting. If we consider the vector of variables in any period t, some of the variables
are state variables chosen in period t − 1 and others are determined by the policy
correspondence (in terms of the state variables). When you analogize period t state
variables to the initial conditions (period t = 0) and the period t policy variables
to the initial period variables (period t = 0), then, by definition, indeterminacy in
period t is only possible if it was possible in the initial period. We have defined initial
condition indeterminacy to capture this latter effect, making it a necessary condition
for incomplete markets indeterminacy.
Our main theoretical result show that initial condition indeterminacy and incom-
plete markets are sufficient conditions for incomplete markets indeterminacy (and hence
long-run effects).
The fact that incomplete markets indeterminacy exists is of limited importance
unless it is combined with an estimation of the effects of this indeterminacy. We apply
the numerical method developed by Feng (2013) to numerically approximate the entire
set of competitive equilibrium. In economies with incomplete markets indeterminacy, by
definition, there exists a continuum of continuation values consistent with equilibrium.
In our numerical simulations, we adopt a consistent means to select continuation values
from this continuum. We consider a variety of different selection rules, where we run
each simulation using a consistent selection rule throughout. The choice of the selection
rule has real effects, so we are thorough in considering a broad range of different selection
rules.
In each simulation, we generate a simulated vector of equilibrium variables over
time. We are particularly interested in two simulated moments: consumption volatility
and asset price volatility. The consumption volatility is the standard deviation of
consumption across cohorts (holding fixed the age of consumption). The asset price
Spear (2012) suggest that a sequentially complete set of short-lived assets together with a long-lived
real asset in positive net supply (such as land) suffice to support an interim Pareto efficient equilibrium
allocation. In this paper, we verify that such a complete asset structure would remove both types of
indeterminacy analyzed in this paper. The analysis in the present paper focuses on incomplete markets
as the conditions for complete markets are quite restrictive and unlikely to be observed in reality.
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volatility is the standard deviation of asset prices across time. Our initial findings
reveal that both of these simulated volatility measures are an order of magnitude larger
than what is predicted from the endowment volatility alone. Further, when we compute
the simulated consumption volatilities after conditioning on the shock realization, we
find that the conditional consumption volatilities are on average more than 90% as large
as the unconditional volatilities.
Next, we numerically approximate the equilibrium set in a sunspot economy. The
sunspot economy is identical to our original economy, except that the states of un-
certainty are now states of extrinsic uncertainty, meaning that the endowments are
independent of the shock realization. As before, we generate simulated vectors of equi-
librium variables and compute the simulated consumption and asset price volatilities.
For both variables, the simulated volatilities for the sunspot economy are on average
more than 90% as large as the simulated volatilities in the original economy with en-
dowment risk.
Our interpretation is to attribute any volatility in equilibrium variables that cannot
be explained by fundamentals to the effects of indeterminacy. Our numerical results
suggest that indeterminacy is an order of magnitude more important in explaining
consumption and asset price volatility than endowment risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model
and defines the competitive equilibrium concept. Section 3 introduces an equivalent re-
cursive formulation called Markov equilibrium, which is important for subsequent com-
putation and simulation. Sections 4 applies the computational algorithm and presents
the simulation results. Section 5 concludes, and the Appendix contains the proofs of
our main results and further details on the algorithm.
2 The Economic Model
In this section, we first introduce the economic environment and then provide the
competitive equilibrium definition.
2.1 Economic environment
Time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2, ... At every date t, a new cohort of consumers enters
the economy. Each cohort consists of a representative consumer that remains in the
economy for 3 periods.
At every date t, the economy is hit by a shock s. The shock follows a Markov chain
over a finite set S = {1, ..., S} as described by the Markov transition matrix Π with
elements pi (s, σ) for all s, σ ∈ S. The observed shock in period t is st. The initial shock
s0 is known to all consumers in the economy. The history of shocks up to and including
period t is st = (s0, s1, ..., st). The history of shocks uniquely characterizes the location
of the economy in the space of time and uncertainty, and is often called a date-event
or node. We use the notation (st, σ)σ∈S to refer to the set of nodes that immediately
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succeed the node st and the notation (st, σ, σ′)σ,σ′∈S2 to refer to the set of nodes that
follow 2 periods after the node st.
At each node, a single consumption good is traded.
The consumers are identified by the node at birth and the age a ∈ {0, 1, 2} in
the current node. The parameter ea(s
t+a) is the endowment of a consumer of age
a in node st+a. This means that the consumer was born in node st. A consumer's
individual endowments follow a Markov process governed by the stationary function
e : {0, 1, 2} × S→ R++, such that for all a ∈ {0, 1, 2} and all nodes st, ea(st+a) =
ea(st+a).
Similarly, the variable ca(s
t+a) is the consumption of a consumer of age a in node
st+a.
In the initial node s0, there exists an age a = 0 consumer, an age a = 1 consumer,
and an age a = 2 consumer. The age a = 2 consumer has the consumption c2 (s0)
and utility function u(c2 (s0)). The age a = 1 consumer has the consumption vector(
c1 (s0) , (c2 (s0, σ))σ∈S
)
and utility function
u(c1 (s0)) + β
∑
σ∈S
pi (s0, σ)u(c2 (s0, σ)).
For a consumer born in node st, define the lifetime contingent consumption vector
as c(st) =
(
c0(s
t), (c1(s
t, σ))σ∈S , (c2(s
t, σ, σ′))(σ,σ′)∈S2
)
∈ R1+S+S2+ . The consumer pref-
erences are assumed to be identical and are represented by the time-separable utility
function U : R1+S+S2+ → R ∪ {−∞} defined as
U(c(st)) = u(c0(s
t)) + β
∑
σ∈S
pi(st, σ)u(c1(s
t, σ))
+ β2
∑
σ,σ′∈S2
pi(st, σ)pi(σ, σ
′)u(c2(st, σ, σ′)).
The one-period utility u satisfies the following conditions:
Assumption 1. The one-period utility function u : R+ → R ∪ {−∞} is C2, differen-
tiably strictly increasing (i.e., uc (c) > 0 ∀c > 0), differentiably strictly concave (i.e.,
ucc (c) < 0 ∀c > 0), and satisfies the Inada condition (i.e., lim
c→0
uc (c) = +∞).
For each node st, there exist J short-lived numeraire assets with fixed payouts in
terms of the consumption good. The J assets are indexed by a superscript j ∈ J =
{1, ..., J} . The equilibrium price of asset j in node st is denoted qj(st). The prices for
all assets traded in node st are collected in the row vector q(st) = (qj(st))j∈J .
The asset payouts follow a Markov chain such that the payouts in the nodes (st, σ)σ∈S
for the asset j traded in node st are given by the column vector rj = (rj(σ))σ∈S .
Additionally, define r (σ) = (rj(σ))j∈J as the row vector of portfolio payouts for the
current shock σ. The asset payouts can be collected into the S × J payout matrix
R =
(
r1, ..., rJ
)
= (r (s))s∈S .
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Assumption 2. The payout matrix is a non-negative and full rank matrix.
Let θja(s
t) denote the amount of asset j purchased by a consumer of age a in node
st. The assets pay out in the following period, specifically in the nodes (st, σ)σ∈S . The
column vector θa(s
t) = (θja(s
t))j∈J contains the entire portfolio of all assets positions
of the consumer of age a in node st. The payout of the portfolio in node (st, σ) is
r (σ) θa(s
t).
In the initial node s0, the age a = 1 consumer and the age a = 2 consumer both
enter the period with a portfolio of assets from a previous (unmodeled) period. We
can refer to this previous (unmodeled) period as period t = −1. The portfolios carried
into the initial node s0 are parameters of the model. The portfolio for the age a = 1
consumer in node s0 is denoted θ0(−1) =
(
θj0(−1)
)
j∈J as an age a = 1 consumer in
node s0 would have age a = 0 in the previous (unmodeled) period t = −1. Likewise,
the portfolio for the age a = 2 consumer in node s0 is denoted θ1(−1) =
(
θj1(−1)
)
j∈J as
an age a = 2 consumer in node s0 would have age a = 1 in the previous (unmodeled)
period t = −1.
Market clearing for assets traded in node st is given by:∑2
a=0
θja(s
t) = 0 ∀j ∈ J.
For any given θ1(−1) and q(s0), the household problem for the age a = 2 consumer
in the initial node s0 is given by:
max
c2(s0)
u(c2 (s0))
subj. to c2 (s0) + q(s0)θ2(s0) ≤ e2(s0) + r (s0) θ1(−1)
.
For any given θ0(−1) and
(
q (s0) , (q(s0, σ))σ∈S
)
, the household problem for the age
a = 1 consumer in the initial node s0 is given by:
max
c1(s0),θ1(s0),(c2(s0,σ))σ∈S
u(c1 (s0)) + β
∑
σ∈S
pi (s0, σ)u(c2 (s0, σ))
subj. to c1 (s0) + q(s0)θ1(s0) ≤ e1(s0) + r (s0) θ0(−1)
c2 (s0, σ) + q(s0, σ)θ2(s0, σ) ≤ e2(σ) + r (σ) θ1(s0) ∀σ ∈ S
.
For simplicity, define θ(st) =
(
θ0(s
t), (θ1(s
t, σ))σ∈S
) ∈ RJ(1+S) as the entire vector
of lifetime contingent portfolios for a consumer born in node st. Given asset prices(
q(st), (q(st, σ))σ∈S , (q(s
t, σ, σ′))σ,σ′∈S
)
, the household problem for a consumer born in
node st is given by:
max
c(st),θ(st)
U(c(st))
subj. to c0(s
t) + q(st)θ0(s
t) ≤ e0(st)
c1(s
t, σ) + q(st, σ)θ1(s
t, σ) ≤ e1(σ) + r (σ) θ0(st)∀σ ∈ S
c2(s
t, σ, σ′) + q(st, σ, σ′)θ2(st, σ, σ′) ≤ e2(σ′) + r (σ′) θ1(st, σ) ∀ (σ, σ′) ∈ S2
.
(1)
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2.2 Equilibrium
We define a sequential competitive equilibrium (SCE) as follows.
Definition 1. A SCE is a collection of prices and choices of consumers {q(st), θ(st), c(st)}
such that:
(i) For each st, taking as given the prices
(
q(st), (q(st, σ))σ∈S , (q(s
t, σ, σ′))σ,σ′∈S
)
,
a consumer born in st solves (1).
(ii) Commodity market clearing for each st :∑2
a=0
ca(s
t) =
∑2
a=0
ea(st). (2)
(iii) Asset market clearing for each st :∑2
a=0
θa(s
t) = 0. (3)
The existence of a SCE can be verified using standard methods (e.g., Balasko and
Shell, 1980; Schmachtenberg, 1988). Moreover, Balasko and Shell (1980) and Schmacht-
enberg (1988) prove that every sequence of equilibrium asset prices {q (st)} is bounded.
Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium asset holdings θ2(s
t) = 0 in all date-events.
In all date-events, the old-age consumers will not carry asset holdings into the future.
In the (unmodeled) period t = −1, young-age and middle-age consumers receive the
portfolios that they carry into the initial period t = 0. The young-age consumers in
period t = −1 are middle-age consumers in period t = 0 and the middle-age consumers
in period t = −1 are old-age consumers in period t = 0. Market clearing must hold for
the (unmodeled) period t = −1, meaning that the parameters θ0(−1) and θ1(−1) must
satisfy:
θj0(−1) + θj1(−1) = 0 ∀j ∈ J.
3 Markov equilibrium and indeterminacy
In this paper, we characterize the entire set of recursive (Markov) equilibrium in
SOLG by adopting the methodology of Feng (2013). We then identify the existence of
indeterminacy by examining the set of recursive equilibrium. In the next section, we
also study the impact of indeterminacy on long-run economy by simulating the models.
3.1 Markov equilibrium
First, we will economize on notation. Recall that market clearing in any node st is
such that θ0(s
t) = −θ1(st). Define the portfolio payout for the age a = 2 consumer in
node st as ω (st) = r (st) θ1(s
t−1) ∈ R. This implies that the portfolio payout for the
9
consumer a = 1 consumer in node st is −ω (st) . Using these facts, we can rewrite the
budget constraints faced by all consumers alive in node st :
c0(s
t)− q(st)θ1(st) ≤ e0(st). (4)
c1(s
t) + q(st)θ1(s
t) ≤ e1(st)− ω
(
st
)
. (5)
c2(s
t) ≤ e2(st) + ω
(
st
)
. (6)
One can define the recursive equilibrium on the natural state space consisting of
the current shock st, and the portfolio payout ω (s
t) . However, as shown in Kubler
and Polemarchakis (2004), such equilibrium may not exist. To restore the recursive
formulation of SCE, Feng et al. (2014) enlarge the state space by considering the shadow
values of investment as an additional state variable. They also develop an iterative
procedure to characterize the recursive equilibrium on this enlarged state space.
In line with Feng et al. (2014), the state variables we consider include the current
shock st, the portfolio payout ω (s
t) , and the shadow values of investment m (st) =
(mj (st))j∈J for the age a = 1 consumer in the current node:
mj
(
st
)
= qj(st)uc(c1(s
t)). (7)
Denote the state space as S× R× RJ+ with typical element (s, ω,m) ∈ S× R× RJ+. The
policy function is defined as f : S× R× RJ+ → RJ+ × RJ such that (q, θ1) = f (s, ω,m)
satisfies the following equations:
mj = qjuc [e1(s)− qθ1 − ω] ∀j ∈ J, (8)
mj = β
∑
σ∈S
pi(s, σ)uc [e2(σ) + r (σ) θ1] r
j (σ) ∀j ∈ J, (9)
where equation (8) is the definition of the shadow value of investment, and (9) represents
the Euler equation for the consumer of age a = 1.9
The expectations correspondence g : S× R× RJ+ ⇒
(
R× RJ+
)S
is a mapping
from the current period state variables (s, ω,m) to the next period state variables
(ω′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S , where (ω
′(σ),m′ (σ)) ∈ R× RJ+ ∀σ ∈ S. By definition,
(ω′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S ∈ g (s, ω,m)
iff for (q, θ1) = f (s, ω,m) and (q
′ (σ) , θ′1 (σ)) = f (σ, ω
′(σ),m′ (σ)) ∀σ ∈ S the following
conditions are satisfied:
ω′(σ) = r (σ) θ1 ∀σ ∈ S, (10)
qjuc [e0(s) + qθ1] = β
∑
σ∈S
pi(s, σ)
m′j (σ)
q′j (σ)
rj (σ) ∀j ∈ J, (11)
where equation (10) is the definition of the portfolio payout, and (11) represents the
Euler equation for the consumer of age a = 0.
9Additionally, define the projections fq : S× R× RJ+ → RJ+ and fθ : S× R× RJ+ → RJ .
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Definition 2. Markov equilibrium is defined by the policy correspondence V∗ : S× R⇒
RJ+ and the transition correspondence F : graph(V∗) ⇒
(
R× RJ+
)S
satisfying the fol-
lowing two properties:
1. For all (s, ω,m) ∈ graph(V∗), F (s, ω,m) ⊆ g (s, ω,m) .
2. For all (s, ω,m) ∈ graph(V∗) and all σ ∈ S, (σ,Fσ (s, ω,m)) ⊆ graph(V∗), where
Fσ : graph(V
∗)⇒ R× RJ+ is the projection onto the shock σ state variables.
We refer to V∗ as the Markov equilibrium policy correspondence and F as the
Markov equilibrium transition correspondence.
Theorem 1. A Markov equilibrium is a SCE.
Proof. See Section 6.1.
Theorem 2. A Markov equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Section 6.2.
3.2 Indeterminacy
Given the Markov equilibrium policy correspondence V∗ and transition correspon-
dence F, the SCE for a given vector of initial conditions can be determined. The initial
conditions are s0 ∈ S, θ1(−1) ∈ RJ , and m (s0) ∈ RJ+.While both s0 and θ1(−1) are pa-
rameters of the model, the shadow prices m (s0) ∈ V∗ (s0, r (s0) θ1(−1)) are endogenous
state variables.
• In period t = 0, given ω (s0) = r (s0) θ1(−1), the vector
(q (s0) , θ1 (s0)) = f (s0, ω (s0) ,m (s0))
is determined as the unique solution to equations (8) and (9). The variables
(ω(s0, σ),m (s0, σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s0, ω (s0) ,m (s0)) must be consistent with the tran-
sition correspondence.
• In period t > 0, given (st, ω (st) ,m (st)) , the vector(
q
(
st
)
, θ1
(
st
))
= f
(
st, ω
(
st
)
,m
(
st
))
is determined as the unique solution to equations (8) and (9). The variables
(ω(st, σ),m (st, σ))σ∈S ∈ F (st, ω (st) ,m (st)) must be consistent with the transi-
tion correspondence.
From the above discussion, we find that there are two types of indeterminacy: (i)
initial condition indeterminacy and (ii) incomplete markets indeterminacy.
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Definition 3. Initial condition indeterminacy occurs if dim (V∗ (s, ω)) > 0 for some
(s, ω) ∈ S× R.
Initial condition indeterminacy is indexed by m (s0) ∈ V∗ (s0, ω (s0)) , meaning that
if the image of V∗ is determinate, initial condition indeterminacy does not arise.
Definition 4. Incomplete markets indeterminacy occurs if dim (F (s, ω,m)) > 0 for
some (s, ω,m) ∈ S× R× RJ+.
Theorem 3. Initial condition indeterminacy is a necessary condition for incomplete
markets indeterminacy.
Proof. This follows by definition.
The relation between the two types of indeterminacy depends upon properties of
the asset structure.
Definition 5. Markets are sequentially complete if J = S and sequentially incomplete
if J < S.
As seen in Demange (2002) and Henriksen and Spear (2012), sequential completeness
does not suffice for (interim) Pareto efficiency. Recall from Demange (2002) that a
feasible allocation is {c(st)} ≥ 0 such that the resource constraints (2) are satisfied in
all date-events. An allocation {c(st)} is (interim) Pareto efficient if there does not exist
another feasible allocation {c˜(st)} such that for all possible histories st and all periods
t :
U(c˜(st)) ≥ U(c(st))
with strict inequality for at least one history st.10
Definition 6. The asset markets are complete if for each initial shock s0, there exists
initial wealth ω (s0) such that the resulting SCE allocation is (interim) Pareto efficient.
As seen in Henriksen and Spear (2012), complete markets is a stronger condition
than sequentially complete markets. While sequentially complete markets is not nec-
essary for incomplete markets indeterminacy, we find that the stronger condition of
complete markets is necessary.
Theorem 4. Incomplete markets is a necessary condition for both initial condition
indeterminacy and incomplete markets indeterminacy.
Proof. See Section 6.3.
Our main theoretical result provides a partial converse, namely that incomplete
markets and a stronger notion of initial condition indeterminacy are sufficient for in-
complete markets indeterminacy.
10The definition includes the corresponding conditions for the initial middle-aged and the initial
young consumers.
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Definition 7. Strong initial condition indeterminacy occurs if dim (V∗ (s, ω)) > 0 for
all equilibrium (s, ω) ∈ S× R.
Theorem 5. An economy with strong initial condition indeterminacy and incomplete
markets will also have incomplete markets indeterminacy.
Proof. See Section 6.4.
4 Computation and Simulation
Knowing that an economy exhibits incomplete markets indeterminacy is of limited
use for welfare analysis. In this section, we consider a stochastic economy with in-
complete markets and conduct numerical analysis to approximate the long-run effects
of incomplete markets indeterminacy. To approximate the long-run effects, we use
the methodological contribution in Feng (2013) and Feng et al. (2014) to compute a
numerical approximation of the Markov equilibrium correspondences.
4.1 Numerical specifications
We consider an economy with one asset (J = 1) and two states of uncertainty
(S = 2). There is an exogenous shock that affects the endowments of the household.
Given the shock realization, the endowment of the age a = 2 consumer changes, while
the other endowments remain unchanged. Specifically, we assume that
e0(s) = 3 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1(s) = 12 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e2(1) = 1 +   = 0.05
e2(2) = 1− 
.
The transition matrix that governs the Markov chain is given by
Π =
[
0.95 0.05
0.05 0.95
]
.
The utility function is given by: u(c) = c
1−b−1
1−b , where the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is b = 4. We set the discount factor β = 0.5.
We borrow these parameter values from Kehoe and Levine (1990), which provides
greater details on the justification of the parameters values chosen for the economy.
To summarize their justification, let one period represent 20 years, meaning that the
discount factor of β = 0.5 corresponds to an annual discount factor of 0.966 = 0.5
1
20 .
The risk aversion parameter b implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.25.
This is similar to the value chosen by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The life-cycle
earnings profile of the household is hump-shaped as in Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
The asset is a real bond with payouts equal to 1 for both states s ∈ S. The initial
conditions of the economy are the initial period shock s0, the initial period bond payout
ω (s0) = θ1(−1), and the initial shadow value of investment m (s0) .
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4.2 Convergence results
We apply the numerical algorithm detailed in Feng (2013) to approximate the
Markov equilibrium policy correspondence V∗. The numerical approximation will be
termed the Markov policy correspondence V : S×Θ⇒ R+, where Θ ⊆ R is the com-
pact set of portfolio payouts for consumers of age a = 1. Such a set is known to exist
since the set of SCE variables is contained in a compact set.
We iterate the algorithm until the Euler equation residuals are bounded above by
some small error bound  > 0. Specifically, the Markov policy correspondence V :
S×Θ⇒ R+ is defined such that for any m ∈ V(s, ω), there exists a vector of variables(
q, θ1, (ω
′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S
)
satisfying (8) and (10) with the Euler equation residuals from
(9) and (11) bounded above by . For the numerical examples we consider, we are
able to compute the Markov policy correspondence V for any arbitrarily small value
 > 0. Citing Theorems 2 and 3 from Feng et al. (2014), the operator B is such that
the fixed point V of our numerical approximation converges uniformly to the Markov
equilibrium policy correspondence V∗ as a function of the discrete partition of the state
space. Further details about the discrete version of the operator B and the numerical
algorithm are contained in the Appendix.
4.3 Discussion of incomplete markets indeterminacy
For this numerical verification, we first compute the Markov policy correspondence
V, which is the numerical approximation to the Markov equilibrium policy correspon-
dence V∗. Given the Markov policy correspondence V, the Markov transition corre-
spondence F : graph(V) ⇒
(
R× RJ+
)S
is approximated such that the equations (10)
and (11) are satisfied (the latter with residuals bounded above by ).
Figure 1 in the Appendix contains the graph of the Markov transition correspon-
dence F. Specifically, it contains the variables
(
s, ω,m, (m′ (σ))σ∈S
)
(for both possible
shocks s ∈ {1, 2}, using the fact that ω is independent of the shock realization s) such
that
(ω′ (σ) ,m′ (σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s, ω,m) ,
where ω′ (σ) = fθ (s, ω,m) . This numerical approximation includes Euler equation resid-
uals bounded above by  > 0 for any arbitrarily small . If the observed incomplete mar-
kets indeterminacy is simply a result of numerical error, then we should observe that
the graphs in Figure 1 are affected by changes in the errors bound  and the mesh size
of the discretization. Our numerical experiments show that the graphs in Figure 1 do
not change once we reach a certain level of precision, namely an error bound  = 10−10
and mesh size equal to 10−6. Applying Proposition 2 from Feng (2013), we are able to
numerically confirm that the economy exhibits initial condition indeterminacy.
Consider the right panel of Figure 1 in the Appendix, which displays the cross-
section of the image of the Markov transition correspondence for both possible shocks
s ∈ {1, 2}. For both shocks s ∈ {1, 2}, the possible values for the next period shadow
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values of investment (m′ (σ))σ∈{1,2} belong to a continuum. The dimension of the im-
age of the Markov transition correspondence equals 1. This finding is consistent with
Theorem 5 which implies that the economy has incomplete market indeterminacy.
4.4 Simulation
Once we solve for the Markov equilibrium, we can generate (simulate) a sequential
competitive equilibrium with the following procedure. First, we pick initial condition
(s0, ω (s0) ,m (s0)) ∈ graph (V∗) . We solve for (q (s0) , θ1 (s0)) = f (s0, ω (s0) ,m (s0)) .
Second, we use a random number generator to determine the value of s1.
11 By definition,
ω (s0, s1) = r(s1)θ1 (s0) . Third, we pick m (s0, s1) such that (i) we satisfy our selection
rule (described below) and (ii) (ω (s0, σ) ,m (s0, σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s0, ω (s0) ,m (s0)). The
final step is the iterative step in which (s1, ω (s0, s1) ,m (s0, s1)) allows us to solve for
(q (s0, s1) , θ1 (s0, s1)) = f (s1, ω (s0, s1) ,m (s0, s1)) . We continue this process for 5, 000
periods.
There are a continuum of choices of initial conditions in the image of V∗ (s0, ω (s0)) ,
and this represents the initial condition indeterminacy. Holding fixed (ω (st) ,m (st)) ,
the right panel of Figure 1 graphs the projection of the transition correspondence
F (st, ω (s
t) ,m (st)) onto (m (st, σ))σ∈S as a function of st. The dashed line refers to
st = 1 and the solid one to st = 2. From Figure 1, there is a continuum of (m (s
t, σ))σ∈S
consistent with the equilibrium, and this represents the incomplete market indetermi-
nacy.
Each of the selection rules specifies a certain property that the continuation variables
(m (st, σ))σ∈{1,2} must satisfy, and these properties are held constant for the entire length
of that simulation.12 We consider 8 different selection rules:
1. Maximize difference in asset prices
Given the current period state variables (s, ω,m), the selection rule chooses
(m′ (σ))σ∈S such that (i) (ω
′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S ∈ F (s, ω,m) and (ii) the difference
|q′ (σˆ)− q| is maximized for the realized shock σˆ (as determined by the random
number generator), where (q, θ1) = f (s, ω,m), ω
′(σˆ) = r(σˆ)θ1, and (q′ (σˆ) , θ′1 (σˆ)) =
f (σˆ, ω′(σˆ),m′ (σˆ)).
2. Minimize difference in asset prices.
3. Maximize difference in bond holdings, i.e., the difference |θ′1 (σˆ)− θ1| is maxi-
mized.
4. Minimize difference in bond holdings.
11We refer the reader to Limic (2009) for the details on simulation of Markov Chain.
12Our selection rules reflect the state-of-the-art for equilibrium selection. To design a more dis-
ciplined equilibrium selection process is undoubtedly interesting, but goes beyond the scope of the
current paper and is left for future research.
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5. Maximize difference in young consumption, i.e., the difference
|e0(s) + qθ1 − (e0(σˆ) + q′ (σ) θ′1 (σˆ))|
is maximized.
6. Minimize difference in young consumption.
7. Maximize difference in middle-age consumption, i.e., the difference
|e1(s)− qθ1 − ω − (e1(σˆ)− q′ (σˆ) θ′1 (σˆ)− ω′(σˆ))|
is maximized.
8. Minimize difference in middle-age consumption.
Notice that we do not consider selections with respect to the old-age consumption
variable. Old-age consumption is e2(σ) + θ1. Indeterminacy does not play a role in this
value, as the only element that depends upon σ is the endowment parameter e2(σ).
4.5 Simulation results
We choose the initial conditions so that θ1(−1) = 3.0 and the initial shock is s0 = 2,
meaning e2 (s0) = 1 − . The initial shadow value of investment is m0 = 5.50, where
m0 ∈ V (s0, θ1(−1)) .13 Simulations last for 5, 000 periods, where the first 1, 000 periods
are ignored when computing simulated moments and simulated conditional moments.
4.5.1 Effects of the selection rules
We run simulations under each of the 8 selection rules introduced previously. The
unconditional moments are reported in Tables 1 and 2 below. The first observation
from the data is that the choice of selection rule matters and has real effects. Among
all 8 selection rules, the young consumption mean is smallest (mean (c0) = 5.862) and
the middle consumption mean is largest (mean (c1) = 5.308) for the selection rule
that maximizes the difference in bond holdings. Diametrically, among all 8 selection
rules, the young consumption mean is largest (mean (c0) = 6.037) and the middle
consumption mean is smallest (mean (c1) = 5.293) for the selection rule that minimizes
the difference in bond holdings. The means for the young consumption can differ by as
much as 3% and the means for middle consumption can differ by as much as 0.3%.
Comparing the simulation in which the asset price difference is maximized and the
simulation in which the asset price difference is minimized, the average lifetime utility
13We perform robustness checks on the choice of initial conditions and find that this choice has no
long run effects. Further details can be found in Subsection 4.5.3.
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for the consumers is 3.96% higher under the latter, which corresponds to a consumption
equivalent gain of 1.3%.
statistics
simulation mean (c0) mean (c1) mean (θ1) mean (q) mean (U)
1 Max ∆q 6.025 5.286 3.690 0.842 -0.0072
2 Min ∆q 6.026 5.295 3.680 0.828 -0.0071
3 Max ∆θ1 5.862 5.308 3.831 0.769 -0.0071
4 Min ∆θ1 6.037 5.293 3.670 0.833 -0.0071
5 Max ∆c0 5.926 5.305 3.769 0.798 -0.0071
6 Min ∆c0 6.030 5.294 3.677 0.830 -0.0071
7 Max ∆c1 5.896 5.304 3.800 0.784 -0.0071
8 Min ∆c1 6.029 5.294 3.677 0.830 -0.0071
Table 1: Simulated means
statistics
simulation std (c0) std (c1) std (θ1) std (q) std (U)
1 Max ∆q 0.431 0.176 0.403 0.226 9× 10−4
2 Min ∆q 0.214 0.072 0.209 0.102 3× 10−4
3 Max ∆θ1 0.474 0.168 0.475 0.195 5× 10−4
4 Min ∆θ1 0.200 0.069 0.191 0.102 3× 10−4
5 Max ∆c0 0.469 0.153 0.464 0.194 5× 10−4
6 Min ∆c0 0.224 0.082 0.215 0.115 4× 10−4
7 Max ∆c1 0.457 0.166 0.452 0.194 5× 10−4
8 Min ∆c1 0.226 0.078 0.215 0.115 4× 10−4
Table 2: Simulated standard deviations
4.5.2 Consumption volatility
Table 3 reports the simulated standard deviations conditional on either shock s = 1
or shock s = 2 being realized.
To assess the volatility of the young-age consumption (for age a = 0 consumers),
consider the 6 simulations that did not include young-age consumption c0(σˆ) = e0(σˆ)+
q′ (σˆ) θ′1 (σˆ) in the objective function. Computing the averages across these 6 simulations
and both potential shocks s ∈ {1, 2} , the conditional standard deviations for c0 are 92%
as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations.
To assess the volatility of the middle-age consumption (for age a = 1 consumers),
consider the 6 simulations that did not include middle-age consumption c1(σˆ) = e1(σˆ)−
q′ (σˆ) θ′1 (σˆ) − ω′(σˆ) in the objective function. Computing the averages across these 6
simulations and both potential shocks s ∈ {1, 2} , the conditional standard deviations
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for c1 are 94% as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations.
statistics
Shock s = 1 Shock s = 2
simulation std (c0|1) std (c1|1) std (c0|2) std (c1|2)
1 Max ∆q 0.367 0.168 0.463 0.185
2 Min ∆q 0.176 0.069 0.199 0.075
3 Max ∆θ1 0.475 0.172 0.447 0.163
4 Min ∆θ1 0.142 0.063 0.195 0.074
5 Max ∆c0 0.257 0.094 0.284 0.101
6 Min ∆c0 0.179 0.082 0.210 0.082
7 Max ∆c1 0.445 0.161 0.453 0.170
8 Min ∆c1 0.179 0.074 0.214 0.081
Table 3: Simulated standard deviations (conditional)
The simulation results (Tables 1-3) reveal three facts: (i) the unconditional standard
deviations for consumption volatility are an order of magnitude larger than the endow-
ment standard deviation, (ii) the conditional standard deviations are strictly positive,
and (iii) the conditional standard deviations are on average more than 90% as large as
the unconditional standard deviations.
These findings suggest that initial condition indeterminacy is present and that en-
dowment volatility is not of first-order importance for explaining consumption volatility.
4.5.3 Robustness check on initial conditions
We also analyze the effects of the initial conditions on the behavior of the economy.
For each of the following experiments, we remain consistent by applying the same
selection rule (chosen from one of the 8 possibilities previously introduced) for both the
benchmark economy and for economies with different initial conditions. Recall that the
benchmark economy specifies {θ1(−1), s0,m0} = {3.0, 2, 5.50}. The first experiment
specifies m0 = 5.10, the second specifies s0 = 1 such that e2 (s0) = 1 + , while the
third specifies θ1(−1) = 4.3128. After we drop the first 1, 000 periods, the simulated
moments and simulated conditional moments are identical to those for the benchmark
economy.
4.6 Sunspot equilibria
To decompose the effects of incomplete markets indeterminacy and endowment
volatility on consumption and asset price volatility, we construct a sunspot equilib-
rium based on our benchmark economy. We maintain the same Markov chain, but the
shocks are now states of extrinsic uncertainty, meaning that the endowments remain
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unchanged. The endowment process is given by
e0(s) = 3 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1(s) = 12 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e2(1) = 1 +   = 0
e2(2) = 1− 
.
There still remain S = 2 states of uncertainty, and consumers need not have the same
price expectations for both states. If the price expectations differ, then any consumption
volatility is owing only to the incomplete markets indeterminacy, since the fundamentals
of the economy remain unchanged.
For each of the 8 consistent selection rules, we run 5, 000 simulations as before
(where each simulation lasts for 5, 000 periods and the first 1, 000 periods are ignored
when computing simulated moments).
The results are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
statistics
simulation std (c0) std (c1) std (θ1) std (q)
1 Max ∆q 0.430 0.180 0.395 0.233
2 Min ∆q 0.210 0.088 0.196 0.104
3 Max ∆θ1 0.497 0.168 0.502 0.189
4 Min ∆θ1 0.184 0.078 0.166 0.094
5 Max ∆c0 0.415 0.149 0.402 0.181
6 Min ∆c0 0.197 0.086 0.182 0.010
7 Max ∆c1 0.462 0.166 0.461 0.187
8 Min ∆c1 0.195 0.081 0.173 0.109
Table 4: Simulated standard deviations (sunspots)
statistics
Shock s = 1 Shock s = 2
simulation std (c0|1) std (c1|1) std (c0|2) std (c1|2)
1 Max ∆q 0.418 0.176 0.443 0.184
2 Min ∆q 0.200 0.088 0.221 0.088
3 Max ∆θ1 0.495 0.169 0.498 0.168
4 Min ∆θ1 0.166 0.072 0.200 0.083
5 Max ∆c0 0.239 0.096 0.269 0.098
6 Min ∆c0 0.198 0.088 0.196 0.083
7 Max ∆c1 0.459 0.165 0.498 0.168
8 Min ∆c1 0.184 0.080 0.205 0.081
Table 5: Simulated standard deviations (conditional, sunspots)
Broken down by variable, the following subsections show that the volatility for
any of the variables (consumption, asset price, asset choice) is driven by the effects of
incomplete markets indeterminacy and not by the endowment shocks.
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4.6.1 Consumption volatility
To assess the volatility of young-age consumption, consider the 6 simulations that
did not include young-age consumption in the objective function. Averaged across these
6 simulations, the standard deviations for young-age consumption in the sunspot model
(no endowment risk) are 97% as large as the standard deviations in the original model
with endowment risk. Similar patterns hold for middle-age consumption. If the sunspot
model accounts for 97% of the consumption volatility, then the volatility is decomposed
as 3% due to endowment shocks and 97% due to indeterminacy.
4.6.2 Asset price volatility
To assess the volatility of the asset prices, consider the 6 simulations that did not
include the asset price q′ (σˆ) in the objective function. Averaged across these 6 simula-
tions, the unconditional standard deviations for q in the sunspot model (no endowment
risk) are 93% as large as their respective unconditional standard deviations with en-
dowment risk. The range for this ratio across all 6 simulations runs from 87% to 97%.
4.6.3 Asset size volatility
In the sunspot model, since c2 (σˆ) = e2(σˆ) + θ1 and the endowment value is equal
across states, then the old-age consumption volatility is identical to the asset size volatil-
ity.
To assess the volatility of the asset holdings themselves, consider the 6 simulations
that did not include the asset choice θ′1 (σˆ) in the objective function. Averaged across
these 6 simulations, the unconditional standard deviations for θ1 in the sunspot model
(no endowment risk) are 89% as large as their respective unconditional standard devi-
ations with endowment risk. The range for this ratio across all 6 simulations runs from
81% to 100%.
4.7 Economies with initial condition determinacy
A sufficient condition for initial condition determinacy is the property of gross sub-
stitution in consumption. While sufficient, this property is not necessary. In a deter-
ministic setting, Kehoe and Levine (1990) and Feng (2013) find economies that do not
satisfy this sufficient condition and yet exhibit initial condition determinacy.
In a stochastic setting, finding the set of economies that lead to initial condition
determinacy remains just as relevant. We consider two experiments in which the econ-
omy parameters are changed. In the first experiment, the parameter for consumer
risk-aversion is reduced from b = 4 to b = 3.2, with all other parameters held constant.
In the second experiment, the endowment process is changed from e = {3, 12, 1± 5%}
to e = {3, 8, 2 ± 5%}, with all other parameters held constant. The two endowment
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processes are given by:
e = {3, 12, 1± 5%} e = {3, 8, 2± 5%}
e0(s) = 3 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1(s) = 12 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e2(1) = 1 +   = 0.05
e2(2) = 1− 
e0(s) = 3 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e1(s) = 8 ∀s ∈ {1, 2}
e2(1) = 2 +   = 0.10
e2(2) = 2− 
For each of the two experiments, we compute simulated moments as in the original
economy. We numerically confirm that the two economies exhibit initial condition
and incomplete markets determinacy. We do not need to implement selection rules,
since there exists a unique vector of state variables each period: (ω′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S =
F (s, ω,m) .
The simulated moments are given in Table 6. For the first experiment (with b
changed from b = 4 to b = 3.2), the ratio std(θ1)
mean(θ1)
= 0.0085, which is 10% as large
as the average ratio across all simulations in the model with b = 4 (average across all
simulations is std(θ1)
mean(θ1)
= 0.088). In terms of prices, the ratio std(q)
mean(q)
= 0.0399, which is
20% as large as the average ratio across all simulations in the model with b = 4 (average
across all simulations is std(q)
mean(q)
= 0.192).
For the second experiment (with e changed from e = {3, 12, 1±5%} to e = {3, 8, 2±
5%}), the ratio std(θ1)
mean(θ1)
= 0.0161, which is 20% as large as the average across all
8 simulations in the model with e = {3, 12, 1 ± 5%}. In terms of prices, the ratio
std(q)
mean(q)
= 0.0896, which is 50% as large as the average across all 8 simulations in the
model with e = {3, 12, 1± 5%}.
Model mean (θ1) mean (q) std (θ1) std (q)
b = 3.2;e = {3, 12, 1± 5%} 5.030 0.331 0.0431 0.0132
b = 4;e = {3, 8, 2± 5%} 2.730 0.346 0.044 0.031
Table 6: Simulated moments (determinacy)
Relative to the baseline economy, a reduction in the risk-aversion parameter or
a reduction in the volatility of the endowment process can lead to initial condition
determinacy. Initial condition determinacy implies incomplete markets determinacy
(Theorem 3), meaning that determinacy does not have long-run effects. The simulation
results in Table 6 reveal that economies with initial condition determinacy have asset
price and asset holding volatilities on the same order of magnitude as the endowment
volatility. Moreover, the asset price and asset holding volatilities for the determinate
economies are 10− 50% as large as the corresponding volatilities for nearby economies
with incomplete markets indeterminacy.
4.8 Discussion of the example economy
Well-known empirical puzzles concerning asset price and consumption volatility doc-
ument that the observed volatility of both variables is higher than what is predicted
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from classical theory.14 This paper does not attempt to solve these empirical puzzles,
but rather to understand what role, if any, incomplete markets indeterminacy plays in
supporting asset price and consumption volatility. We study simple economies in which
the effects of indeterminacy on asset price and consumption volatility are easily elicited,
and thus only utilize a stylized calibration as in Kehoe and Levine (1990).
The cohorts in our economies consist of a unit mass of homogeneous households that
each live for 3 periods. This is the simplest setting in which asset trade is nontrivial.
The mechanism under which indeterminacy has real effects requires nontrivial asset
trade: households form beliefs about the asset prices in future periods, trade assets
based upon these beliefs, and use the asset payouts to smooth consumption. We view
each period as lasting for 20 years and impose a life-cycle earnings profile consistent
with Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).
Without a more realistic calibration, our numerical results provide an incomplete
answer to the question of whether incomplete markets indeterminacy in SOLG models
provides a theoretical foundation for the asset price and consumption volatility observed
in the data. What we have learned is that incomplete markets indeterminacy does
matter; it has real effects and these persist in the long run. The next step is to evaluate
the degree to which our numerical results extend to a more realistic setting. Does the
scale of the model matter? Our theoretical results and computational methodology are
both immediately applicable to a large scale model, but in a large scale model, the
relation between indeterminacy and volatility becomes blurred and the computation
becomes untractable.
In the current model, households live for 60 years (the expected lifespan for adults),
but only receive 3 realizations of uncertainty during their lifetime. In a large scale model,
households would continue to live for 60 years, but would instead receive realizations
of uncertainty every year (or every quarter). The partition of uncertainty will be finer,
and households will be able to trade on this uncertainty with higher frequency. We
hypothesize that the effects of indeterminacy will be amplified with higher frequency
trading, as households have more opportunities to form self-fulfilling beliefs about asset
prices in future periods.
14The excess volatility puzzle (see LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981)) documents that asset
price volatility is much higher than what is predicted by classical theory with additively separable and
CRRA utility for a representative household. The closely related equity premium puzzle is based upon
the recognition that it is not possible to adjust the risk aversion parameter and reconcile the model with
both the equity premium and the risk-free rate observed in the data (see Mehra and Prescot (1985) and
Weil (1989)). For further discussion of asset pricing volatility, see Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and
Backus, Chernov, and Zin (2014). Consumption volatility refers to the fact that observed consumption
volatility is much greater than what is predicted by the Permanent Income Hypothesis, which can be
interpreted as a setting with complete financial markets (see Krueger and Perri (2006)).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effects of indeterminacy on consumption and asset
price volatility in SOLG models. We introduce the concept of incomplete markets
indeterminacy and compute its effects by (i) approximating the entire set of competitive
equilibria and (ii) running simulations over a variety of selection rules. Our simulations
indicate that the choice of selection rule has welfare effects. Even for the selection
rules with the most conservative predictions, we find that indeterminacy is an order of
magnitude more important than endowment risk in explaining consumption and asset
price volatility.
These findings suggest that for economies in which indeterminacy is present, con-
sumers' expectations of prices play an important role in the allocation of resources. It
is only in understanding how these expectations affect resource allocation that we can
implement welfare-improving policies. Analysis of specific welfare-improving policies in
this class of models is left for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
To show that a Markov equilibrium satisfies the SCE definition, the Euler equations
(9) and (11) must be necessary and sufficient for household optimality. Necessity is
immediate. Sufficiency follows as households are finite-lived.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 2
From the standard arguments used to show the existence of a SCE, the set of shadows
prices of investment m (st) belong to a compact set ∆ ⊆ RJ in all nodes. The iterative
construction begins with the correspondence V0 : S× R⇒ RJ+ such that V0 (s, ω) = ∆
∀ (s, ω) ∈ S× R.
Given a correspondence Vn : S× R⇒ RJ+ for any n ≥ 0, define an operator B that
maps the correspondence Vn : S× R⇒ RJ+ to a new correspondence Vn+1 : S× R⇒
RJ+ defined as follows:
Vn+1 (s, ω) =
m ∈ ∆ :
for (q, θ1) = f (s, ω,m) ,
there exists m′ (σ) ∈ Vn (σ, r(σ)θ1)∀σ ∈ S and
(q′ (σ) , θ′1 (σ)) = f (σ, r(σ)θ1,m
′ (σ))∀σ ∈ S such that
qjuc [e0(s) + qθ1] = β
∑
σ∈S
pi(s, σ)m
′j(σ)
q′j(σ) r
j (σ) ∀j ∈ J
 .
The correspondences are defined recursively using this operator B :
Vn+1 = B (Vn) .
The Markov equilibrium policy correspondence is defined as follows:
V∗ (s, ω) = lim
n→∞
B (Vn (s, ω)) ∀ (s, ω) ∈ S× R.
Theorem 1 from Feng et al. (2014), reproduced below, guarantees the existence of a
Markov equilibrium policy correspondence.
Theorem 6. Let V0 be a compact-valued correspondence such that V0 ⊃ V∗. Let
Vn+1 = B (Vn) , n ≥ 0. Then, Vn → V∗ as n → ∞. Moreover, V∗ is the largest fixed
point of the operator B, i.e., if V = B(V), then V ⊂ V∗.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that the markets are complete. This
implies that the allocation is (interim) Pareto efficient. The equilibrium allocation is
stationary (see Henriksen and Spear, 2012). This implies that both V∗ and F are
single-valued correspondences.
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6.4 Proof of Theorem 5
The transition correspondence F : graph(V∗)⇒
(
R× RJ+
)S
defined by
F (s, ω,m) =
(ω
′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S :
ω′(σ) = r(σ)fθ (s, ω,m)
m′ (σ) ∈ V∗ (σ, ω′(σ))
q′ (σ) = fq (σ, ω′(σ),m′ (σ))
qjuc [e0(s) + qθ1] = β
∑
σ∈S
pi(s, σ)m
′k(σ)
q′k(σ) r
j (σ) ∀j, k ∈ J
 .
By definition of fq (σ, ω
′(σ),m′ (σ)) :
m′k (σ)
q′k (σ)
=
m′1 (σ)
q′1 (σ)
∀k.
This means that the J Euler equations given by:
qjuc [e0(s) + qθ1] = β
∑
σ∈S
pi(s, σ)
m′1 (σ)
q′1 (σ)
rj (σ) ∀j ∈ J.
Suppose, in order to obtain a contradiction, that incomplete markets indeterminacy
does not hold. This implies that F (s, ω,m) is determinate (0−dimensional image)
for all state variables (s, ω,m) . Under initial condition indeterminacy, V∗ (σ, ω′(σ)) is
indeterminate (strictly positive dimension) for all state variables (s, ω,m) (with cor-
responding state variable (σ, ω′(σ) = r(σ)fθ (s, ω,m))). This implies that for all state
variables (s, ω,m) , ∃! (ω′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S such that the Euler equations are satisfied.15
If (ω′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S is uniquely determined, then with q
′ (σ) = fq (σ, ω′(σ),m′ (σ)) , the
vector
(
m′1(σ)
q′1(σ)
)
σ∈S
is uniquely determined.
If
(
m′1(σ)
q′1(σ)
)
σ∈S
is uniquely determined, the Euler equations for both the young and
middle-aged consumer imply:
(uc [e1(σ)− ω′ (σ)− q′ (σ) θ′1 (σ)])σ∈S
uc [e0(s) + qθ1]
=
(uc [e2(σ) + ω
′ (σ)])σ∈S
uc [e1(s)− ω − qθ1] .
For all state variables (s, ω,m) , it is not possible to find a Pareto-improving re-
allocation. This means that the allocation is (interim) Pareto efficient, meaning that
markets are complete. This completes the argument.
6.5 Numerical Algorithm
The vector of possible values for bond-holding and shocks are given by Θˆ =
{
θi10
}Nθ
i1=1
,
Sˆ =
{
si20
}Ns
i2=1
. For each pair of the bond-holding and shock grids,
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
, we also de-
fine a finite vector of possible values for the image of the correspondence: Vˆµ,ε0
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
=
15With multiple vectors (ω′(σ),m′ (σ))σ∈S satisfying the Euler equations, any vector in the convex
hull would also satisfy the Euler equations. The convex hull is a set with strictly positive dimension.
This is inconsistent with the initial supposition that F (s, ω,m) is determinate.
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{
mi1,i2,j0
}Nv
j=1
.16 Notice, limNθ→∞ Θˆ = Θ, limNv→∞ Vˆ
µ,ε
0
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
= V˜µ,ε0
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
. Fi-
nally, we construct the discrete version of operator Bh,µ,N by eliminating points (in the
Euler equation, for a predetermined tolerance  > 0) as follows:
1. Given
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
, pick a point mi1,i2,j0 in the vector Vˆ
µ,ε
0
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
. From mi1,i2,j0 we
can determine the values of
(
θ
′i1,i2,j, qi1,i2,j
)
by solving for
mi1,i2,j0 − qi1,i2,j · uc
(
e1(s
i2
0 ) + θ
i1
0 − qi1,i2,jθ
′i1,i2,j
)
= 0. (12)
mi1,i2,j0 − β
∑
s′
pi(s′|s0)uc
(
e2(s
′′i1,i2,j
)
= 0 (13)
Thus, if for all m′ ∈ Vˆµ,ε0 (θ′i1,i2,j, s′) =
{
m
′l(θ
′i1,i2,j, s′)
}NV
l=1
we have
min
m′∈{m′l}NV
l=1
∥∥∥∥qi1,i2,j · uc (e0(si20 )− qi1,i2,jθ′i1,i2,j)− β∑ pi(s′|si20 )(m′q′
)∥∥∥∥ >  (14)
where the value of q′ is determined by the same procedure in finding
(
θ
′i1,i2,j, qi1,i2,j
)
,
then Vˆµ,ε1
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
= Vˆµ,ε0
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)−mi1,i2,j0 .
2. Iterate over all possible values mi1,i2,j0 ∈ Vˆµ,ε0
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
)
, and all possible
(
θi10 , s
i2
0
) ∈
Θˆ× Sˆ.
3. Iterate until convergence is achieved sup
∥∥∥Vˆµ,εn − Vˆµ,εn−1∥∥∥ = 0.
At the limit of the above algorithm, we have limn→∞ Vˆµ,εn = Vˆ
µ,ε∗ .
6.6 Figure
16Notice the portfolio of the household has S components in stochastic case. In the case of two
shocks, θ0 = (θ0,1, θ0,2).
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Figure 1: Equilibrium set of
{
{m′(σ)}σ∈{1,2} ,m
}
at given {s, ω}.
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